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Urgent Action Needed About Iran
The message of the Iranian people’s
nationwide uprising

July 1, 2009

Our dear friends in Ashraf and Paris are calling on us for action! We will be working on letters for you to send, but please dont wait on us! Go GREEN on the 4th of July to support the Iranian democratic protests!

The Iranian people’s nationwide uprising against the religious fascism ruling Iran has entered its third week. This uprising and the results of the elections preceding it took the world by surprise and ruined all the West’s political calculations on Iran. Below, I will discuss this issue in more detail:

A sham election with pre-determined results

  1. Prior to the regime’s presidential election, many Western countries and others thought that there would be a real competition in this election and that Mir Hossein Mousavi would win as a moderate candidate, leading to a complete change in Iran. Western television networks began to prop up this notion two weeks prior to the polls.
  2. However, the Iranian Resistance, which is fully aware of the nature of the regime of the velayat-e faqih (or absolute rule of the religious jurisprudent) and its sham election, announced before the vote that the election would, as in previous cases, prove to be nothing more than a sham. It also said that for as long as the clerical regime is in power, free elections in Iran would be meaningless. (Attachment 1: NCRI statement on the election)
  3. The staging of televised debates and the unprecedented revelations marked a new phase in the escalation of factional feuding within the regime and signalled the deepening of the regime’s internal crisis. However, the West touted these debates as part of a democratic process in Iran. In contrast, the President-elect of the Iranian Resistance described them at the time as the beginning of the end for the velayat-e faqih regime. (Attachment 2: Position of the NCRI President-elect about the Ahmadinejad-Mousavi debate)
  4. A day before the election, the NCRI’s Secretariat released a statement revealing that the mullahs’ Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, had issued a secret directive to the Interior Ministry to announce voter turnout to be at least 35 million and to proclaim Ahmadinejad as the winner in the first round. Everyone else, who took for granted that Mousavi would win, looked at the NCRI statement with disbelief. But as we saw, using his special “electoral engineering” methods, Khamenei did indeed rendered Ahmadinejad the winner in the first round with about 40 million votes. (Attachment 3: NCRI Statement of 11 June on the election)
  5. But the reality was that contrary to the smokescreen produced by the regime’s television, the election was replete with unprecedented levels of fraud and inflation of voter turnout figures. The true voter turnout was only a fraction of what the regime has claimed. The prevalence of fraud in the regime’s elections has been something that the Resistance has consistently highlighted during all the previous sham elections. But this time, even the mullahs’ internal factions have acknowledged it. For example, the Mousavi camp has said that the alleged voter turnout has been between 95 to 140 percent of the total number of eligible voters in 170 cities. The level of ignominy was such that the Guardian Council, which is affiliated with Khamenei, admitted that voter turnout in 50 cities was above 100 percent of the total eligible population, adding that this was completely normal since many people from other towns went to the noted cities to vote, something that has occurred in previous elections as well!

Nationwide uprising and its characteristics

  1. This uprising is the result of an incredibly explosive state of society and its goal is the overthrow of the regime in its entirety and the establishment of democracy in Iran. Iranian society has suffered from 30 years of dictatorship, suppression, corruption and crime. This explosive state made use of the fracture that appeared at the pinnacle of the regime’s hierarchy during the sham election. In reality, the uprising has nothing to do with the internal factions of the regime or the election itself. The main issue at hand is the explosive state of society and the people’s widespread discontent, which revealed itself by using the infighting of the regime as an opportunity.
  2. The mullahs’ regime brought all its suppressive forces into the scene to try to extinguish the flames of the uprising. Based on reports from the social headquarters of the People’s Mojahedin Organisation of Iran (PMOI), more than 200 protestors have been killed thus far in the course of the unrest, with thousands of others injured and arrested. In major cities and particularly Tehran  an undeclared martial law has been imposed. On 20 June, the day after Khamenei’s threatening speech, more than 100 people were killed. On 30 June, the French daily Figaro quoted eye-witnesses as saying that 4,500 people were arrested in Tehran alone during the 20 June protests and have been placed under brutal torture. Nonetheless protests and clashes continue in Tehran and in many other major cities.
  3. The most important factor in this uprising is its slogans, with the key one being “Death to the dictator”. This slogan has become stronger as time goes on and in many cases it has evolved into the chants of “Death to Khamenei”. It is therefore clear that the goal of the protestors is the overthrow of the regime and nothing else. Moreover, as the uprising has progressed the use of the signs and symbols relating to Mousavi have gradually decreased. There are no longer green clothes or scarves seen in the protests or at least they have become very rare. On 23 June, the Associated Press reported from Tehran: “The ribbons and banners of his "green wave" election campaign have been much less conspicuous at recent marches and clashes. The chants were less about Mousavi's demand for a new election and more about general outrage toward the ruling establishment, including once unimaginable denunciations of supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.”
  4. By and large, the activists and detainees of the uprising did not participate in the election. For example, relatives of Neda, a young woman who was martyred on 20 June  after the regime’s agents opened fire on her, have said that she had not voted in the election. The regime’s officials have also reiterated that 60 percent of those attested in Tehran and 90 percent of those arrested in Isfahan had not participated in the election.
  5. This reality has on numerous occasions been confirmed and reiterated by the regime’s officials. In his Friday prayers sermon on 19 June, Khamenei reiterated that all four presidential contenders are part of the clerical establishment and are loyal to the system of velayat-e faqih. He said that those taking to the streets are opponents of the whole system. The regime’s Interior Minister, Sadeq Mahsouli, on 14 June reiterated that the street protests were the work of political grouplets (a reference to the PMOI) and have nothing to do with the candidates. Several days later, he also said that the CIA and the Monafeqin [the derogatory term used by the regime to refer to the PMOI] were funding these protests.

    Mullah Taeb, a key figure in the regime’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), has said: “It is not right to say that people have wreaked havoc over election-rigging, since the clashes are being instigated by those who do not believe in the regime. The footprints of the Monafeqin [PMOI] can be detected in these disturbances.” (State-run news agency Fars, 15 June 2009)

  6. In parallel to the escalation of suppression, the heightening of the atmosphere of terror, and the radicalization of the situation, the leaders of the regime’s disenchanted factions keep a greater distance from this uprising, and try to get closer to Khamenei in order to protect themselves.
    • On 14 June, only two days after the poll, Mousavi met with Khamenei. He subsequently issued a statement declaring his allegiance to the regime’s constitution and the velayat-e faqih system.
    • The State Expediency Council, which is chaired by the mullahs’ former president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, announced on 26 June that issues relating to the election must be pursued through legal avenues and insisted on Khamenei’s leadership.
    • Rafsanjani has also personally praised Khamenei in recent days and has even told some members of the regime’s Majlis (Parliament) that he feels eternal love for Khamenei, and that they have a loving relationship.
    • In his statement of 24 June to Iranians living abroad, Mousavi reiterated that all measures must be in the framework of “the holy Islamic Republic system”. He urged them to break ranks with the counter-revolutionaries and those who have rejected “the holy Islamic Republic system” (another reference to the PMOI).

Future of the uprising and prospects

  1. Taking the most general view, there could be two possible outcomes. One possible outcome could be that the regime fails to seal the rift at its highest levels and in the end fails to quell the uprising. In such a scenario, the uprising will continue until the regime is overthrown. A second possible outcome could be that the regime manages to seal the rift at the top and completely suppresses the uprising.
Continuation of the uprising
  1. Obviously the persistence of the uprising would be the most favorable and beneficial scenario for the Resistance, and we should do our utmost to make that happen. This is because an end to the velayat-e faqih regime and the establishment of a new system, even a relatively democratic system, is of the greatest benefit to the Iranian people and Resistance. It is not important for the Resistance what role or how much influence after the overthrow of the regime it would gain. What is important for it is to have a right to political life and activity in the new system and have its own offices and be able to participate in free elections. In that case, the best yardstick would be the decision and vote of the people.
  2. Some people assume that if the uprising were to continue, certain world powers could attempt to set up new alternatives to the regime and remove the Resistance from the scene. This assumption is completely misguided. The only objective the Resistance and the PMOI have been struggling for has been to bring end to the velayat-e faqih regime and to establish democracy in Iran. If other alternatives to the regime were to be set up in the midst of all this, so long as they overthrow the velayat-e faqih regime that would fulfill the ultimate desire of the Resistance and the Resistance would welcome it.  The PMOI wants nothing other than the right to free political activity and free elections. Of course, it is also true that to build an alternative to the regime is not an easy task, and over the past 30 years all efforts to establish an alternative have failed to bear fruit, except the PMOI and the National Council of Resistance of Iran.
  3.  When the Shah’s monarchy collapsed, PMOI members had just come out of prison and had no organization outside prison. They held no instrument for publicity and were not as organized and consolidated as they are now. Their strength was less than one percent of what it is now. But the semi-democratic environment provided them with the opportunity to conduct their activities. That is why they managed to fill the gap rapidly and became a serious opposition and an alternative to the regime within a few months. Within only 11 months after the Shah’s overthrow, the PMOI grew to such an extent that Khomeini was seriously worried that if Mr. Rajavi remained as a candidate in the presidential election, then there would be a second round of elections where he had a very good chance to win. Thus, contrary to his earlier pledge not to interfere in the elections, Khomeini issued a fatwa just a few days before the vote and  rejected Mr. Rajavi’s candidacy.

Suppression of the uprisings by the regime

  1. Even in the second scenario, that is if Khamenei  manages to hem the internal gap of the regime and suppress the nationwide uprising, still, the situation cannot be reverted back to the previous state of affairs.  This means that the domestic and international state of affairs will not return to circumstance which prevailed prior to June 12, 2009.  The situation will be completely different, and one cannot claim that the uprising  has failed; quite the contrary, the uprisings will have favorable consequences for the next steps of the people's struggle against the Islamic fascism ruling Iran. Thus, in this scenario, too, the uprisings would not at all be defeated. Thus far, the uprisings have been successful and have had tremendous achievements. For example:
    • Through these uprisings, the Iranian society and particularly its youth, who have entered social and political life during the reign of this regime, rose up against this regime.  The regime had tried to keep this generation apolitical, but during through this period of uprisings this generation has been transformed into a completely political generation.  If this uprising is suppressed, this generation will become more radical and will turn to the PMOI and organized resistance.
    • On the other hand, the regime is also much weaker than before.  After its internal surgery and purge, the regime will be more vulnerable and the internal problems which have been  temporarily covered will resurface and reveal themselves with greater force.
    • After the internal purges and the nationwide uprisings, the regime will be forced to intensify its efforts both internally and abroad, which means that it will intensify its fight against the West when it comes to the export of terrorism and pressing ahead with efforts to obtain nuclear weapons.
    • In short, the third option will be the only solution which will be embraced further by the Iranian people while the international community will not be able to find any other solution.

The role and stance of the Resistance

  1. What is the role of the PMOI and the Iranian Resistance in these uprisings? Some try to make it appear as if the PMOI have no role in these uprisings and conclude that this resistance has no support inside Iran.  First of all and independent from the realities on the ground, the PMOI are not too eager to show they serve a special role in the uprisings. Because what is important for the PMOI, is the following:
    • First, an uprising has formed in Iran which reiterates the slogans and objectives that the PMOI have been voicing for three decades, that is, the overthrow of the mullahs' regime and the establishment of democracy in Iran.  The Iranian Resistance has sacrificed thousands of lives to reach this point, so what more can it ask for?
    • Secondly, it will help to the best of its capability to direct the uprisings in the right direction and see to its victory and if it does not have the chance to reach final victory in this phase, for it to last as much as possible.
    • In other words, uprisings are a strategic issue for the Iranian Resistance, in which it directly or indirectly seeks the overthrow of the regime, and it is not by any standard a subject of debate and discussion or campaign bickering.
  2. In the above context the Resistance rejects any kind of dogmatic and sectarian view about the uprisings, and welcomes anyone who distances themselves from the religious dictatorship and denounces the velayat-e faqih.  This is why Mrs. Rajavi stated in her speech in Villepinte, Paris, that despite the past actions of Mousavi and his factions, if they condemn fully the usurping of the right of the Iranian people to sovereignty and reject the velayat-e faqih regime in its totality, we will welcome them and whatever the circumstances may be, we condemn any aggression and violation of human rights by the Khamenei – Ahmadinejad faction against them and their families.
  3. On 29 June when the regime's Guardian Council announced after 15 days that Ahmadinejad's election is final and in reality complied with Khamenei's command to finalize the result of the sham elections, the Iranian Resistance once more announced that "the national unity and solidarity which the President-elect of the Iranian Resistance called for over two decades ago is the key to victory." As you can appreciate, this call for solidarity embraces all those who seek the nullification of the elections and the holding of free elections under UN supervision.

Social Headquarters of the PMOI

  1. For this reason, aside from any campaign fanfare, the Iranian Resistance has placed the uprisings as its top priority inside and outside of Iran, to the extent that it has overshadowed the campaign for Ashraf and has turned it to a secondary matter. The social headquarters of the PMOI has actively performed its role in the uprisings from the first moments of its start, a role that due to restrictions would not be prudent to reveal in detail. The social headquarters has served key roles in three fields:
    • The guidance of the uprisings in the correct direction, promotion of proper slogans, and preventing the protests from being diverted.
    • Strengthening and steering the uprisings towards victory or at least prolonging them as much as possible.
    • Echoing the voice and news of the uprisings to the international community in light of the severe censorship of news within Iran.
  2. After the Iranian regime expelled foreign reporters from Iran and forbid the publication of any type of report on internal affairs, the social headquarters has been the main source for export of films and reports from inside Iran. Iran National Television (the resistance television) reports the uprisings at a measure incomparable to other media outlets as far as quality, quantity and speed is concerned.  This headquarters is also the source of most of the video coverage aired on other foreign media outlets. Some of the clips aired by media outlets such as CNN are clips which were aired hours or days before by Iran National Television.
  3. Aside from its organizational practices, the PMOI and its supporters are deeply tangled with the Iranian society, contrary to what the regime is trying to portray. More than 120,000 PMOI members and sympathizers have been killed by the regime to date. Close relatives, friends and loved ones of these individuals form a large population in Iran. There is hardly a street in Iran that has not dedicated a PMOI martyr. Independent of the PMOI’s structure, the families of PMOI martyrs form the biggest force for dynamic opposition to the clerical regime in today’s Iran, and due to the brutal suppression, they have not had the opportunity to publicly show their affiliation. To the martyrs’ families, one must add the families and relatives of Ashraf residents and the families of PMOI sympathizers abroad. All this forms a huge potential, the active presence of which is today perceptible and clear. In truth, the PMOI have had one objective, which has become more of an ideal for them. That is, the uprooting of the regime and establishment of democracy in Iran. We have dedicated thousands of martyrs to instill the slogan of “Death to Khomeini” in Iranian society. Now in the course of the protests, people chant the same slogans we have been chanting. This uprising has taken our slogans of “Death to dictator” and “Death to Khamenei” to a national level.

The West’s biggest blunders and the accuracy of the Iranian Resistance’s analysis

  1. The sham elections, the expectations surrounding it, and the ensuing uprising, all served to show that the analyses and assessments of the Resistance and its allies on the international level with regards to the regime, the Iranian society, and future prospects, were correct, and that in contrast Western investments and analyses were wrong, diverted, and entangled in self-serving political and economic interests. We can delve into the issue in more detail on three different levels:
  2.  First, the stability of the regime: One of the most important conflicts of opinion between the Resistance and Western countries surrounds the Resistance’s view that the regime is unstable and tries to fool others by painting a stable and strong image of itself. All Western governments, media outlets, and analysts rehash the regime’s claims in this regard, adding that the regime is stable, enjoys a broad social base and that there is no other factor which threatens its rule. The recent uprising made it clear that such illusive stability was never part of reality.
  3.  Second, the society’s explosive potential: The Iranian Resistance had said and had reiterated on many occasions that the Iranian society detests the clerical regime, and that secret regime public opinion polls attest to the fact that more than 94% of the people want the regime to be changed. The Resistance had insisted on its view that the society is in an explosive state. In contrast, the West attempted to argue that the regime has a social base, is not as hated by the people, and the Iranian population is not feeling as much pain. Many Western reporters who traveled to Iran reported that people were living in calm and peacefully co-existed with the regime. They used to release pictures showing that in northern parts of cities forced veiling of women is not being imposed as vigilantly and that there is not so much disenchantment among the population. … In a word, they all fulfilled the interests of the regime in showing that it has stability.

    In order to justify their trade deals and contracts with the regime, the West argued that if the regime were to be placed under sanctions then the people would side with it and as such patriotic sentiments would be fueled in favor of the regime.

  4.  Third, the existence of moderate factions within the regime: For three decades, Western powers have searched for moderates within the clerical regime. From the outset, the Iranian Resistance’s leader argued that a viper would never give birth to a dove, and underscored the regime’s lack of capability for moderation and reform, noting that no conceivable alternative exists within the regime.
  5.  In a word, it is the Iranian Resistance and its international friends and allies who are proud and vindicated. Their assessments, positions and strategies have been correct, in contrast to those who advocated appeasement of the clerical regime, who are now proven to be wrong and disgraced. Today is not the time for blame, however, but to rather show the right path and remind everyone to what extent Western parties got it wrong when it comes to Iran. The time has come for them to correct their policies. Instead of listening to the regime in a one-sided manner and forced to step in the wrong direction, they should hear the Iranian people and the Resistance.

Western countries’ position

  1. As indicated above, today everyone knows that Western countries have committed huge mistakes during the past three decades when it comes to Iran, and that they were on the wrong side completely, having sided with the dictators. They wrongly believed and advocated that the regime is stable, that the society has learned to accept the regime, that a moderate can be found within the regime’s ranks, and that the regime can be changed from the inside. Today, all these assumptions and beliefs have turned out to be completely bogus.
  2.  In recent days, the most credible media sources and experts, who do not have significant connections with the Iranian regime, point to several issues with regards to Iran: The numerous crises and weaknesses of the regime, criticizing the wrong analyses and assessments of the past about Iran, the violent suppression, and the imperative of changing the regime. Even experts who fabricated theses in recent years in defense of the Iranian regime have been sidelined. On 29 June, The New York Times said that Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter’s National Security Advisor, who has incidentally been one of the proponents of appeasement with the regime, has been convinced that the current situation in Iran is “the beginning of the end for the Iranian equivalent of the neocons, the radical ayatollahs who see the world as a battle between good and evil.”
  3. Consider several other quotes from credible international sources:
    • Le Monde’s editorial of 30 June, entitled “Iran of Terror,” said, “In Iran the era of terror has arrived. The regime’s legitimacy has been criticized more than ever before. It imprisons, tortures, and kills, as if it does not find itself sufficiently strong or confident to leave some room for the expression of opinion by the legal opposition, even if the opposition wants to remain within the confines of the Islamic Republic. With the support of Khamenei, Ahmadinejad has unleashed his guard dogs into the streets, with their targets being anyone who forms part of the broad coalition around Mousavi. If the regime is really telling the truth that 63% voted for Ahmadinejad, why does it suppress like this? More than 2,000 people have been arrested since the day Iranians dared to take to the streets. Plain-clothes agents work round the clock, raiding people’s houses even at nights. Even Ahmadinejad’s supporters threaten dissidents with execution.”
    • Ms. Noëlle Lenoir, former French Minister for European Affairs, in an article entitled “soft diplomacy is a European expertise but does not work with Iran,” and published in the French magazine, L’express on 26 June, said, “… This form of diplomacy was tested by Europeans between 2002 and 2004. At the time, they had a kind of a mandate from the Bush administration to negotiate with Iran. This did not have any results, and I am certain that it instead allowed the regime to more efficiently move towards completing the building of the bomb. … I remember well, because I was present in many negotiations among European ministers about the course of dialogue with Iran. This was a notion that in 2000 was very much accepted. It did not consist of anything else than pampering the mullahs in a bid to convince them to cease building nuclear facilities for the enrichment of uranium. Instead, they proposed more help and recognition. … Was this naïve or foolish? I do not know. Either way, it was useless.”
    • On 23 June, the New York Times published an analysis by Roger Cohen, a renowned author who was in Iran during the uprising, saying that, “At the very peak of its post-revolution population boom, the regime has lost a whole new generation — and particularly the women of that generation — by failing to adapt.
    • On 27 June, a Washington Post editorial wrote: “Yet it is becoming quite clear -- for all who care to see it -- what the Khamenei-Ahmadinejad regime will offer if it survives: harsh repression at home and unrelenting hostility toward the West. If the regime chooses to "engage" at all with the United States, it will be to bolster its shaky legitimacy, not to surrender its nuclear program or its support for terrorism. The only plausible path toward ending the threat it poses is that demanded by the demonstrators: regime change.”
  4.  But, despite these realities, the Western governments’ approach towards the Iranian people’s uprising, is still the continuation of the same mistakes they have committed in the past.
    • The European Union, its member states, and even more so the United States, were at first shocked by the events in Iran because they had not expected them. They thought of Iran as the island of stability and had made huge investments on it. They neither anticipated Ahmadinejad’s reinstatement nor did they expect to see the Iranian people’s uprising. The surprise was more prevalent in the US, where the US President was forced to change his position and rhetoric about Iran on 5 or 6 different occasions in the span of several days.
    • Next, they merely expressed worry about the suppression of peaceful protests in Iran and issued incredibly weak and mild condemnations, not going beyond mere rhetoric. In other words, they did not resort to practical action against the regime.
    • Even worst, both the EU and the US are still seeking negotiations and dialogue with the regime in Iran. In the midst of popular protests and the killing and suppression of the Iranian people, they seek to continue negotiations with the regime on the nuclear issue, claiming that this issue must be separated from elections, which is a domestic issue for Iran.
  5.  But, regardless of its justification, the continuation of this mistaken policy, and the continuation of appeasement towards the Iranian regime, again no matter what the justification, will not only harm the Iranian people but will also cause enormous damages for Western countries. Human rights violations and killing of people, which Mr. Solana describes as an internal matter, is in fact not considered to be a domestic issue anywhere in the world. The EU and US relations with the people and future of Iran is being shaped today. Silence and inaction with regards to the crimes and killings being committed in Iran, and ignoring the demands of millions of Iranians who have poured into the streets chanting “Death to dictator” and calling for democracy, sends an incredibly negative signal to the Iranian people. In January 1978, when President Carter was a guest of the Shah of Iran for dinner, he said, “Iran is the island of stability.” Less than one year and 16 days later, the Shah was forced to flee Iran forever. The situation in today’s Iran is incredibly more volatile that it was in January 1978.
  6.  The time has come for the West to calibrate itself with the trajectory of events in Iran and with the Iranian people’s demands. Mrs. Maryam Rajavi, the President-elect of the Iranian Resistance, formulated the Iranian people’s demands as follows (these are affirmed by all democratic forces in Western countries, and form a necessary prelude for the establishment of democracy, stability and peaceful co-existence in Iran):
    • Annulment of the elections, and holding of free elections under the supervision of the United Nations, and within the context of popular sovereignty and not the velayat-e faqih.
    • Cessation of diplomatic relations with the Iranian regime and imposition of comprehensive sanctions on trade, arms, and technology with the regime until the suppression has completely ended.
    • Referring of the Iranian regime’s crimes dossier to the UN Security Council and formation of an international tribunal to investigate the crimes of the regime’s leaders, especially Khamenei and Ahmadinejad.
    • Banning visits by the heads of the regime to foreign countries.

Attachment 1:

The Iranian people will boycott the clerical regime’s sham presidential election

The Iranians will decisively boycott the Iranian regime’s illegitimate presidential election next month as they have done with previous elections. By doing so, they will once again reject the religious fascism ruling Iran.

Elections under the clerical rule are merely another means to consolidate the religious fascism’s domination over the country, while settling the share of power among factions. The common denominator for factions is their involvement in murder and suppression of the Iranian people, plundering the national wealth, as well as exporting terrorism and fundamentalism abroad. That is why the Iranian nation’s response to such theatrics, which are performed under the banner of elections, is nothing but a boycott. No one except the regime’s cohorts who play a part in the mullahs’ suppression and plunder will participate in the regime’s sham elections and they only make up less than 3 percent of the entire population. Contributing to such theatrics is tantamount to helping the inhumane clerical regime advance its suppressive and terrorist agenda.

The Iranian regime’s leaders know full well that even the smallest degree of genuine respect for popular will would translate into accepting free elections, which would allow the Iranian people to brush them aside immediately and for ever. That is why in the face of repeated calls by the Iranian Resistance throughout the past three decades for free elections under the UN auspices and in the context of popular sovereignty, the regime has only responded by more suppression.

The mullahs’ Supreme Leader controls all the levers of power within the clerical regime, and the president is simply a puppet. In accordance with Article 110 of the regime’s constitution, the Supreme Leader formulates the regime’s policies, and is responsible for appointing senior commanders of the military, police and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), as well as the highest judicial authorities, the head of the state-run radio and TV, and the clerics of the Guardian Council. The Guardian Council, according to Articles 93 and 99 of the constitution, monitors all elections and vets all candidates. Election laws stipulate that all elected officials must “be spiritually devoted to the Supreme Leader and obligated to him in practice.”

The results of next month’s sham presidential election have already been predetermined by the mullahs’ Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei. He has set the stage for astronomical ballot fraud, declaration of false and over-exaggerated statistics on turnout, and finally declaring the desired candidate as the winner.

The IRGC is the main instrument and driving force for Khamenei’s ominous agenda and directs the course of events during elections. Four years ago, it was the IRGC, which in accordance with Khamenei’s wishes secured Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s victory. This time around, Khamenei, who is certain of the nationwide boycott of the elections by the Iranian people, has officially demanded the involvement of the IRGC’s Bassij Force during the elections in a bid to administer widespread fraud.

The main candidates in this election expose the true nature of the regime’s sham election. Among them are Ahmadinejad, the mullahs’ current president, Mohsen Rezai, former commander of the IRGC, Mehdi Karoubi, former Majlis (Parliament) speaker, and Mir Hossein Moussavi, former Prime Minister during the 8-year war with Iraq and one of the leading elements involved in export of terrorism and execution of political prisoners including the massacre of 30,000 prisoners in the summer of 1988.

For many years, these candidates have occupied the highest posts within the regime and rank among the most criminal individuals in Iran’s contemporary history. Considering any criteria, they must all be tried for crimes against humanity.

Secretariat of the National Council of Resistance of Iran

May 12, 2009

Attachment 2:

Iran: A turning point in mullahs’ escalating internal feuding – Maryam Rajavi

Mrs. Maryam Rajavi, President-elect of the Iranian Resistance, described Wednesday‘s television debate between mullahs’ president Ahmadinejad and Mir-Hossein Moussavi, a presidential candidate and a former prime minister, where the mullahs’ secrets were revealed, as a turning point in the regime’s escalating internal feuding and a devastating blow to its entirety. Whoever comes out of ballot boxes is doomed to suffer from its scathing and broad consequences, she reiterated.

Immediate reaction by Hashemi Rafsanjani, former president and the head of the regime’s Expediency Council, to the debate and his call to respond on television to charges made there against him is the unraveling outcome of the debate.

Mrs. Rajavi added that the escalation of infighting and uncovering of internal secrets of the regime have deeply worried mullahs’ Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. He allowed the debate between the candidates - approved by him personally - in a bid to warm up the already boycotted sham election. This was a miscalculation and a clumsy imitation of election campaigns in other countries. For the medieval regime with no capacity for such debates, the Wednesday’s event was a blow to its entirety before benefiting one or the other candidate.

Fearful of the surfacing scandalous secrets of the regime, Khamenei came on stage the following day to pull the reis and control the crisis. Warning the leaders of the regime, he said: “Do not let the firm structure of the regime break down. If it does, then no wound will be healed and the ruins will not be mended. We have to take care of the strong structure of the Islamic system as Imam [Khomeini] taught us…We should not allow confrontation, arguments or conflicts [among ourselves]. You must be careful. If you noted that someone is insisting on causing chaos and conflict, be aware that he is either a traitor or extremely ignorant.”

Mrs. Rajavi emphasized that Ahmadinejad-Moussavi debate only unveiled a small part of the crisis, decadence and corruption within the regime and its plunder of the nations’ wealth and its role in terrorism. According to some people within the regime, in this unbridled power struggle the parties involved in the debate uncovered the kind of things which were only exposed previously by the Iranian Resistance.

In the meantime, the evolving consolidation of the clerical dictatorship has led to polarization within Khamenei’s faction in mullahs’ parliament and traditional groupings there and various bodies in the regime. So far, the grouping known as Association of Clergy and leading figures in Khamenei’s faction such as Ali Larijani, Speaker of the parliament; Ahmad Tavakoli, Mohammad Reza Bahonar and Haddad Adel, former Speaker of the parliament; have refrained from rendering public support to Ahmadinejad. This is while they know full well that Khamenei is pressing hard and engineering for maximum rigging in order to bring out Ahmadinejad from the ballot box.

Mrs. Rajavi also recalled the Iranian Resistance’s revelations 22 years ago regarding the mullahs’ terrorist plot to bomb Mecca and set fire to the holy shrine. The Resistance provided detailed information and the names of people involved in that heinous and unforgiveable crime that the regime persistently attributed to the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI). But, in the course of the regime’s internal feuding, Ahmadinejad reminded Moussavi that it was under his government that explosives and the agents with a terrorist plan left Tehran Airport to Saudi Arabia. This was in response to Moussavi when he mentioned about Ahmadinejad sending missiles to Ghaza.

Secretariat of the National Council of Resistance of Iran

June 5, 2009

Attachment 3:

According to Khamenei’s order the number of voters should be announced more than 35 million, over 75 percent of eligible voters

Mullahs’ Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has ordered that the number of voters in the presidential election on Friday should be announced 35 million, more than 75 percent of the eligible voters, according to reports from Iran. To this end, officials of the regime in the ministries of interior and intelligence, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Bassij Paramilitary Force and other bodies have been ordered to forge ballots, exaggerate figures and arrange for riggings, in order to facilitate the release of this figure.

In addition, Khamenei is trying to get Ahmadinejad to be announced as the winner in the first round of voting using his special "election engineering", threats, intimidation and rigging.

Mrs. Maryam Rajavi, President-elect of the Iranian Resistance, stated that the re-appointment of Ahmadinejad as the regime’s president would mean the regime's evolution towards uni-polarization is complete. It will result in further internal surgeries within the clerical rule and widespread domestic and international repercussions.

She added that the escalation of power struggle in the regime and exposure of its internal secrets was a decisive blow to the regime in its entirety. Whoever becomes the president, she noted, would be doomed to suffer from the scathing and broad consequences of the revelations.

In a cunning effort, the regime has declared that the number of eligible voters is 46.2 million. This is while, according to official figures released by Iran’s Center for Statistics, the number of eligible voters is 51.2 million. In order to facilitate forging votes and rigging ballots, the clerical regime has printed and distributed 57 million ballots around the country.

Secretariat of the National Council of Resistance of Iran

June 11, 2009

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