Many have described Russia's attack on Georgia as a turning point in
international affairs. Pundits thunder that we are returning to an age of
great-power conflicts. Globalization and integration have been exposed as
shams. Russia is playing this new Great Game with ruthless brilliance, and
the United States and Europe are foundering. Almost all of this instant
analysis will prove sensationalist and incorrect.
It's true that today's world is characterized by the emergence of China,
Russia and India as great powers. Economic growth is producing new centers
of influence, leading to greater national pride, confidence and
assertiveness. But powerful new countervailing forces -- of globalization
and integration -- are also working to mitigate nationalism and
unilateralism.
The attack on Georgia will go down not as the dawn of a new era of
Russian power but as a major strategic blunder. Russia has scared its
neighbors witless, driving them firmly into the arms of the West. For
almost two years, Poland had been dragging its feet on the American
proposal to deploy missile interceptors there as part of a continent-wide
shield. Days after the Russian invasion, Warsaw agreed to the deployment.
Ukraine had long been divided on whether to have closer ties to the West. A
few years ago, 60 percent of the country wanted some kind of federation
with Russia instead. Now Kiev has asked for a path to NATO membership.
Vladimir Putin has done more for transatlantic unity than a President
Barack Obama ever could. The United States and Europe are in greater
strategic agreement now than at any point in the past two decades. Even the
autocracies in the Caucasus have reacted negatively, refusing to endorse
Russia's actions and legitimize the new facts on the ground. China has
refused its support.
And what did Russia get for all this? Seventy thousand South Ossetians.
Some have compared the attack on Georgia to the Soviet invasions of
Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. A more telling historical
parallel might be the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Then, as now, a
Kremlin elite drunk on high oil prices foolishly overreached and triggered
a counteraction in the region and across the world.
This is not the 19th century, when the Russian intervention would have
been standard operating procedure for a great power. In fact, only 50 years
ago Britain and France clung to their colonies -- in Algeria, Vietnam,
Kenya, Cyprus -- with much greater determination and violence than has
Moscow. By contrast, this is the first time since the breakup of the Soviet
Union that Russia has sent troops into a neighboring country (one it had
ruled since 1801). Its actions are deplorable, but the worldwide reaction
is a sign of how much the rules have changed. President Bush seemed to
understand this when he spoke of Russia's behavior being unacceptable "in
the 21st century."
Diplomats are searching for ways to make Moscow pay for its actions, to
weaken its standing in international bodies, suspend some agreements, break
some joint enterprises. These are all worth looking into. But it's
important to note that we have this leverage only because we have spent the
past two decades building up ties with the Russians. In fact, the real
challenge we face in dealing with Moscow is that we have too few such ties
and, as a result, too little leverage.
The problem is not that Russia has been integrated into a world order and
that this has still failed to deter it but, rather, that the country
remains largely unintegrated -- and thus feels it has little to lose by
breaking the rules. Some of Moscow's isolation may have been caused by
Western foreign policy -- certainly that is the Russian perception -- but
more has to do with oil. As the price of oil and other natural resources
has risen over the past decade, Russia has become more dysfunctional,
corrupt, dictatorial and assertive. And oil wealth everywhere -- from
Venezuela to Iran to Russia -- breeds independence from and indifference to
international norms, markets and rules.
The single best strategy for bringing Russia in line with the civilized
world would be to dramatically lower oil prices, which would force the
country to integrate or stagnate. Pending that, we should shore up Georgia
and assist countries such as Poland and Ukraine. At the same time, we
should stay engaged with the Russians so that we continue to work on issues
of common concern -- such as nuclear proliferation -- but also to develop
leverage with them. A strategy that further isolates Moscow would only
reduce the levers that we have to affect its behavior.
Let us imagine that we had kicked Russia out of the Group of Eight and
broken most ties with Moscow -- as John McCain, and many neoconservatives,
have long wanted to do. Then, when the Russians attacked Georgia, we would
have been faced with only two options -- appeasement or war.
The writer is editor of Newsweek International and co-host of PostGlobal,
an online discussion of international issues. His e-mail address is
comments@fareedzakaria.com.