China has often been heralded as a country that thinks in broad strategic
terms stretching over decades instead of years. However, China’s approach to
doing business with despots is remarkably ad hoc, commodity-driven, and
short-sighted. While many Western nations have deservedly withdrawn investments
from Sudan, Zimbabwe, and Burma and worked to isolate these governments for
their appalling human rights records, Chinese support is helping Sudanese
President Omar el Bashir, Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe, and Burmese Senior
General Than Shwe maintain power. What China has failed to calculate is that
while it continues to garner short-term benefits from engaging such unsavory
actors, the long-term cost of this approach will be highly deleterious. It is a
sad irony that while China was once seen as an avid supporter for liberation
movements in the 1960s and 1970s, it is increasingly viewed as the lead defense
lawyer for some of the worst governments around the world.
China’s demand for natural resources to fuel its growing economy has driven
Beijing into relationships with regimes that are inherently unstable, and these
investments are not secure. As the governments in Sudan, Zimbabwe, and Burma are
replaced by less authoritarian regimes, the new governments will surely remember
that Beijing provided full backing for the former oppressors-in-chief. In Sudan,
a return to full-scale civil war would directly threaten Chinese oil interests.
In Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe cannot cling to power indefinitely. A post-Mugabe
regime will review and likely revoke agreements that Mugabe signed and repossess
state assets that he sold to the Chinese. Similarly, China continues to offer
robust support to its neighbor Burma, where the military junta has mismanaged
the economy into what one expert calls "a wasteland of missed opportunity,
exploitation, and direst poverty.[2]" It is hard to imagine that
the determined monks and student leaders working to bring change to Burma will
have fond memories of Chinese influence if they make it into power.
As China liberalizes and integrates further into the global economy and
international political system, it needs its trade and diplomatic partners to
play by the rules. If Chinese weapons continue to undermine stability, if
Chinese investments continue to flout environmental and labor standards, and if
Chinese political support for the world’s most noxious regimes continues to
undermine international efforts to protect civilians from crimes against
humanity, Beijing will come under increasing global pressure to change its
behavior. China does very well in the short term by striking deals with despots
willing to offer commodity concessions to China as a means to bankroll their
continued hold on power, but 20 years from now this approach will look very
foolish indeed.
With the 2008 Beijing Olympics, human rights activists have skillfully used
China’s most visible entry onto the world stage as an opportunity to shine a
light on the Chinese government’s relationships with Sudan, Zimbabwe, Burma, and
other criminal regimes. While these efforts have yielded some minor concessions
from Beijing, the hope that these Olympics could be used to push China to become
a more responsible stakeholder in the international system have been dashed by
Beijing’s dreadful track record in the months leading up to the games.
Some pundits have pointed to China’s less-than-enthusiastic backing for the
UN/AU peacekeeping force in Darfur, or UNAMID, as a welcome shift in policy, but
Beijing’s limited amounts of aid to UNAMID are dwarfed by its military,
economic, and diplomatic support for a Sudanese government that continues to
treat its citizens in Darfur as military targets. China is Sudan’s largest
trading partner, a dominant player in its energy sector, and a major supplier of
arms and technology. In 2007, Beijing gave Khartoum a $13 million interest-free
loan for the construction of a new Presidential Palace—alone worth more than the
$11 million that China has provided to assist the 2.7 million civilians
displaced by the Sudanese military and proxy janjaweed militias.[3]
In Zimbabwe, China helped block UN Security Council action after operation
"clear out the trash," Robert Mugabe’s 2005 campaign to destroy some 700,000
homes and businesses in areas of opposition support. While Mugabe thumbed his
nose at the international community, the Chinese government donated midnight
blue tiles for the roof of Mugabe’s 25-bedroom palace[4]. After the
brutal government crackdown on the peaceful demonstrations by Buddhist monks and
pro-democracy activists during the ‘Saffron Revolution’ of September 2007, China
continued to openly provide arms to the junta, shipping 21 155mm artillery
cannons in seven trucks that crossed the border from China in broad daylight on
November 6, 2007[5].
1. Sudan
Control of Sudan’s oil wealth was at the center of the 1983-2005 civil war
between Sudan’s ruling National Congress Party, or NCP (formerly the National
Islamic Front), and Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, or SPLM. When the
escalation of that conflict in the 1990s resulted in the exit of western
companies such as Chevron, Chinese state-owned oil companies quickly filled the
void. China now has a preponderant influence on Sudan’s energy sector, with $8
billion invested in 14 projects, including a 40 percent stake in the Sudanese
oil consortium, the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company[6]. To protect this investment, China
uncritically backs the NCP with new investments, weapons sales, and diplomatic
cover. Yet while the possibility of a genuine democracy in Sudan and/or Southern
Sudanese independence could complicate Chinese oil interests, a return to war is
a far greater threat to Beijing’s considerable investments.
Recent reporting by the BBC has uncovered evidence of Chinese support for the
Sudanese military in Darfur that, if accurate, would constitute a violation of
the U.N. arms embargo. This includes the supply of Chinese-manufactured trucks
that were shipped to Sudan in 2005, as well as the training of Sudanese fighter
pilots who fly Chinese A5 Fantan fighter jets in Darfur[7]. China’s Special Envoy Liu Guijin has denied
that this constitutes a violation of the arms embargo, claiming "A few shots of
Chinese trucks in Darfur cannot be used to accuse China of fuelling the conflict
in Darfur[8]." Regardless of whether it knowingly violated
the arms embargo, China was the largest reported supplier of military weapons
and small arms to Sudan from 2002 to 2005[9]. China has
also provided technical assistance to Sudanese weapons factories producing items
ranging from light machine guns to tanks. In the Security Council, China has
worked assiduously to shelter Khartoum and weakened enforcement mechanisms for
targeted sanctions and the arms embargo for Darfur.
2. Zimbabwe
China’s relationship with Robert Mugabe goes back more than 30 years to its
support for the liberation struggle against Rhodesia. However, unlike other
governments that have distanced themselves from Mugabe since he plunged Zimbabwe
into political and economic crisis, China has offered Mugabe unconditional
support. Spurning the United Kingdom and its Western allies, Zimbabwe embraced a
so-called ‘look East’ policy during the 2000s. Beijing’s investment in Zimbabwe
has soared as Mugabe’s policies have driven its economy into ruin. In return,
Mugabe has granted China access to Zimbabwe’s natural resources, including the
world’s largest reserves of platinum. Chinese companies have contracts worth
hundreds of millions of dollars to supply everything from hydroelectric power
generators to commuter buses.[10]
China has continued to supply Mugabe’s ZANU-PF with arms throughout the
current crisis. In 2000, when a campaign of land seizures and political violence
was used to intimidate the opposition, Mugabe purchased $1 million worth of
AK-47s from China, paying with elephant ivory[11].
China has also sold Zimbabwe J-7 fighters and radar equipment and six advanced
Karakorum 8 fighter jets[12]. In April 2008, when
Mugabe again decided to retain power at all costs with rigged elections and
political violence, a major arms shipment from China was due to be delivered to
Zimbabwe. Initially boycotted by South African longshoremen, it remains unclear
whether the arms arrived in Zimbabwe or were recalled to China, as Beijing
claimed[13].
In New York, China has shielded Zimbabwe from sanctions by the Security
Council on numerous occasions. Most recently, following the flawed June 27
elections, China joined with Russia to veto targeted sanctions that would have
imposed an arms embargo and travel and financial restrictions on Mugabe and 13
of his top henchmen. This approach further estranged Beijing from the United
States, United Kingdom, and France when such major powers desperately need to
work in concert to solve the crises in Zimbabwe and Sudan.
3. Burma (Myanmar)
China’s energy deals with the devil are not limited to Africa, and its
support for the military junta in neighboring Burma follows a familiar pattern.
As with Sudan and Zimbabwe, China filled the economic vacuum in Burma after the
United States and others imposed sanctions following the crackdown on a popular
uprising against military rule in 1988. Following the country’s last free
election in 1990, Burma’s government imprisoned democratically elected leader
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, and has kept her detained for much of the last 18 years.
The junta is also well-known as one of the world’s greatest recruiters of child
soldiers, identified for this practice in four consecutive reports by the U.N.
Secretary-General[14].
China’s support includes at least 17 onshore and offshore oil and gas
projects, including a dual oil and gas pipeline that would connect Burma to
Yunnan province and allow Chinese oil supplies to avoid the strategically
vulnerable Malacca Strait, as well as major hydropower infrastructure and nickel
and copper mining enterprises[15]. China has backed up
its economic interests in Burma with more than $3 billion in arms sales,
provided via interest-free loans and barter deals[16].
This includes tanks and armored personnel carriers, jet fighters, ground attack
aircraft, and gunboats[17]. The junta’s
treatment of Burma’s people ranks with Sudan and Zimbabwe as some of the worst
in the world, but China shielded the junta at the Security Council, vetoing a
resolution calling for a transition to democracy in January 2007, and softening
critical language in a presidential statement following the crackdown on
peaceful protests during the ‘Saffron Revolution’[18].
Beijing acquiesced to Burma’s catastrophic decision to proceed with a rigged
constitutional referendum while denying access to international aid following
the May 2 Nargis Cyclone that killed an estimated 138,000, including the forced
eviction of cyclone survivors from schools to make room for polling
stations[19]. Following the cyclone, China has kept
Burma off the agenda of the Security Council, claiming there is no need for
council action[20].
Endnotes
By Enough Team: This paper was a collaboration involving a number of ENOUGH
staff including Gayle Smith, John Prendergast, John Norris, Colin Thomas-Jensen,
and David Sullivan.
[2] Dr.
Sean Turnell, "Burma’s Economic Prospects," Testimony before the Senate Foreign
Relations Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, March 29, 2006.
[3] Save
Darfur Coalition, "China in Sudan: Having it Both Ways," October 18, 2007.
[4] BBC
News, "Zimbabwe report discussed at UN," July 27, 2005.
[5] Saw
Yan Naing, "Chinese Military Weapons Seen En Route to Burmese Army Units," The
Irrawaddy, December 6, 2007.
[6]
International Crisis Group, "China’s Thirst for Oil," Crisis Group Report No.
153 (June 9, 2008) p. 23.
[7]
Hilary Andersson, "China is ‘fuelling war in Darfur,’" BBC News, July 13, 2007.
Also see Amnesty International, "Sudan: arms continuing to fuel serious human
rights violations in Darfur" (2007).
[8] BBC
News, "China Rejects BBC Darfur Claims," July 15, 2008
[9] Small
Arms Survey, "Arms, Oil and Darfur," Sudan Issue Brief Number 7, July 2007
[10]
Michael Wines, "Zimbabwe’s Future: Made in China," International Herald Tribune,
July 25, 2005.
[11]
Jonathan Manthorpe, "China Trades Guns for Market Access in Zimbabwe," Vancouver
Sun, October 28, 2004.
[12]
David Shinn, "Africa and China’s Global Activism," Paper presented at National
Defense University Pacific Symposium, June 20, 2006.
[13] Ministry Of Foreign Affairs of the People’s
Republic of China, "Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Qin Gang’s Remarks on the
Untrue Report about the ‘Anyuejiang’ Cargo Ship," available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/t440463.htm
[14] Human Rights Watch, "Sold to be Soldiers: The
Recruitment and Use of Child Soldiers in Burma," October 2007.
[15]
EarthRights International, "China in Burma," September 2007.
[16]
Alan Boyd, "China’s Brazen Myanmar Move," Asia Times Online, August 21, 2003.
[17] "China's Ambitions in Myanmar," IISS Strategic
Comments, July 2000.
[18] Paul Tighe, "Myanmar Must Make Positive Proposals
to UN Envoy," Bloomberg, July 25, 2008.
[19] "Vote Was Something To Endure for Cyclone Victims,"
International Herald Tribune, May 27, 2008.
[20]
Michelle Nichols, "U.N. Security Council split on how to deal with Myanmar,"
Reuters, July 24, 2008.