Wesley Wark
Citizen Special

June 18, 2007

Any advanced nation will attract its share of spies, but allegations of China's attempts to harass immigrant dissidents in Canada are particularly troubling

A young Chinese diplomat -- ex-diplomat in fact -- has emerged as a significant thorn in the side for the People's Republic of China. Chen Yonglin defected from the Chinese consulate in Sydney, Australia, in May 2005. He professed to dislike his official duties, which included keeping tabs on and harassing the local Falun Gong movement.

Chen Yonglin not only called attention to China's disagreeable habit of targetting Chinese dissidents overseas, he also caused a sensation by revealing the scale of Chinese espionage operations in Australia. He stated that China had an army of 1,000 spies in Australia.

Since being granted asylum by Australia, Chen Yonglin has travelled to other Western countries, bearing the same warning message regarding Chinese state harassment of dissidents and Chinese espionage. He brought it to Canada recently, reigniting concern about China's overseas operations.

Chen Yonglin may sound like an alarmist, but his claims have plausibility. They have been corroborated by other defectors from China and match the reported experience of Falun Gong adherents in the West. Since declaring war on the Falun Gong as a dangerous "cult" in 1999, the Chinese regime has pursued its members with a vengeance and ferocity that is difficult to fathom. The Chinese regard Falun Gong as one of the five "poisonous" movements threatening Chinese state security -- the others are secessionist and ethnic movements such as those that champion Tibetan or Taiwanese independence.

Mr. Chen's own background is instructive. He was a university student during the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989 and apparently underwent a process of "political re-education" before being allowed to join the Chinese Foreign Ministry in 1991.

Since defecting he has become a crusader for the pro-democracy movement in China and a defender of the Falun Gong. There are others like Mr. Chen, and there will be more like him in the future as China struggles with its economic and political transformation away from communism. He and his ilk pose a challenge for the Chinese regime, which it has met badly to date. They also pose a challenge for Western democracies like Canada.

When allegations of espionage are mixed with stories of state repression, governments have a duty to respond. While some may regard the overt political messaging by the Harper government protesting Chinese intelligence operations in Canada as being ideologically driven and harmful to overriding economic interests, the truth is that speaking out about Chinese spying in Canada is a matter of old-fashioned realpolitik. What is at stake is a defence of Canadian sovereign interests. The only question is where and how to draw the line.

Any technologically advanced society must accept these days that it is likely to draw the attention of a variety of spy services -- and Canada is no exception. Making a huge public fuss about the activities of Chinese intelligence operations in Canada that target economic interests or national secrets would be tilting at windmills -- the activity cannot be stopped. It can and must be monitored effectively and every effort made to ensure that the drain of genuine secrets is not great. Providing occasional sharp reproofs and sending the occasional "diplomat" packing when the evidence warrants is all part of the game.

What is not tolerable, and what requires a different approach, is the use of Chinese espionage assets to target the immigrant Chinese community in Canada either for development as spies, or, more usually, for political harassment and intimidation. This is a form of political interference that cannot be condoned.

The Chinese government needs to be made to understand this clearly, and Canadians of Chinese descent who find themselves subject to such pressures must believe that they have the government on their side and can call on its protection.

There are a range of tools available: direct government protests to the Chinese; expulsion of unwanted "diplomatic" personnel; legal action against agents of the Chinese government not protected by the Geneva conventions.

But probably the most important tool is developing an understanding between Chinese-Canadians and the government that would help shield any vulnerable members of the community from intimidation and harassment, as well as provide an information resource to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, charged with keeping an eye on Chinese intelligence operations.

There may or may not be Chen Yonglin's army of 1,000 Chinese spies in Canada. But there should be no doubt that China has emerged as the number one counter-intelligence problem for CSIS.

In recent testimony to the Senate committee on national security and defence, CSIS director Jim Judd stated that keeping a watch on Chinese espionage operations alone takes up half of all the resources devoted to counter-intelligence. Goodbye Russia and the Cold War.

In an age when all eyes are fixed on terrorism as a threat to national security and when CSIS is about to morph into an overseas spy service, it would be a good idea to pay some sustained attention to the China problem as it manifests itself inside Canada.

Intelligence services are often viewed as inherently problematic for democratic norms. On the Chinese espionage file, CSIS could beat the rap and prove a beneficial guardian of Canadians' rights and liberties.

Wesley Wark is a professor at the Munk Centre for International Studies at the University of Toronto, specializing in security issues.

© The Ottawa Citizen 2007